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## THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF BERTRAND RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY

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A philosophical argument is the attempt to record and communicate a vision. Or, if this phrase appears to fasten upon the philosopher the stigma of a mere visionary, let me say an intellectual perception—intellectual, because what he perceives is not even mainly made up of sense-data; perception, because it shares the directness and the self-sufficiency with which the sheer quality of sounds and sights comes to him. In speaking thus of vision or intellectual perception, I have no intention of setting up any antithesis between seeing and thinking or reasoning, nor do I mean to deny that the most comprehensive and penetrating philosophical visions are achieved, I might almost say built up, only through a toilsome process of reflection and argument. I use vision in the wide sense in which even thinking is a way of seeing, is indeed essentially the effort to see things as they are. There is no need to quote authorities, however great. My appeal is to the whole tradition which, from the earliest days of philosophy, has drawn from the eye and from its medium, the light, the language for expressing the way in which philosophical truth strikes upon the mind. The metaphors of the eye of the soul and the light of reason, of the clearness and lucidity of true thought and its power of illumination, run through the whole history of philosophy since Plato in the *Republic* likened the Form of Good to the sun, because it makes all things visible to the eye of thought as the sun makes them

visible to the eye of the body. It is only because words, defaced by much usage, have lost the vividness of their original meaning, that we speak of a man's philosophical "view" when we mean his "theory," and forget that to be engaged in theory is, in literal meaning and in actual fact, to be a spectator.

Why do I insist that philosophy is vision rather than argument—and that as an opening to a discussion of the religious aspect of Mr. Bertrand Russell's philosophy? Because I am convinced that forgetfulness of the difference between vision and argument is a constant temptation for all of us to take up a wrong attitude towards another's philosophy. If we argue against another without sharing his way of looking at things, we are sure to miss the full effect of what he has to communicate to us, and we are sure also to criticise him in the wrong spirit. Philosophical criticism is all too full of the clash of arguments and all too empty of the appreciation, nay even the enjoyment (in the sense in which we enjoy fine art and poetry), of what is valuable in another's vision.

I shall be told that it is impossible to compare philosophy with poetry or fine art, on the ground that art does not argue whereas philosophy does. A painting maintains no thesis. A poem expresses a vision or a mood, it does not assert a proposition. Art demands to be enjoyed, philosophy claims our intellectual assent or else provokes our intellectual challenge. To the one we respond with "How beautiful!" to the other with "How true!"

All this I grant, nor would I be understood as denying that philosophers' visions not only differ as works of art differ, but clash, and that they clash just because each, in claiming to be true, claims also that its opponent is, more or less, false. With the clash of such claims we are, of course, in the sphere of argument as ordinarily understood. The point of my plea, however, is just that

this is neither the whole nor the best attitude towards philosophy. Just as the world of poetry is enriched by every new nuance of feeling, every fresh thrill of thought or observation that any poet succeeds in voicing, so the world of philosophy is expanded by every fresh view which any thinker, pursuing honestly the truth as he sees it, puts within our reach. Even though we may violently disagree with him, the paradoxical fact remains that our intellectual world is richer by the presence in it and the pressure upon it of the very visions which we combat and deny. After all, he would be a poor philosopher in whom the experience of his failure to share another's vision did not keep alive a humble conviction of the limitation of his own, of some poverty in it of range or insight.

The upshot of all this is that the first and foremost function of all argument in philosophy is, not so much attack and defence in polemical debate, as reasoned exposition. It is to marshal and exhibit the materials which, envisaged synoptically, yield a particular thinker's vision. Even in criticism its aim should be to supplement and adjust rather than to refute or dispossess an opponent of his views. Philosophy is a curiously two-sided business, at once supremely individual and supremely universal. It is self-communion at least as much as it is communication to others. In thinking for himself, the philosopher thinks also for others, even for those with whom he disagrees and who disagree with him. But just for this reason, the best he can do in argument is to account to himself and others for just why and where his own vision compels him to dissent from that of another. Hence, if in the following pages I have to express frequent disagreement with Mr. Russell's views, it will not be because I cherish any illusion that I can prove him wrong or win him over to my view, but because, having tried, as every student of modern

philosophy must, to learn from a thinker so fresh, so stimulating, and above all so sincere, I have found my way of looking at things persistently refuse to fit itself to the pattern of his.

If Mr. Russell has gained a position in the very front rank of modern thinkers, it has been through the brilliant qualities of his work in mathematical logic and in epistemology, and through his stimulating advocacy of scientific method in philosophy. It has not, I venture to think, been due in any large measure to his two or three essays on Religion, its nature and its place in human life. Most students of philosophy know him as one of the foremost champions of the principle of "external relations," or as the author of a new theory of truth and error, or as a keen critic of Idealism and a potent ally of all shades of Neo-realism. Few only treat his views on religion as an integral part of his thought. Most of his keenest disciples appear to ignore *The Free Man's Worship* and *The Essence of Religion*, as if they had no connection with, no bearing upon, the rest of his philosophy; as if they were nothing more than brilliant exercises in literary style, or expressions of a passing mood, or even of a queer emotional streak in a mind otherwise so strikingly intellectual, so severely logical, so wholly given up to clear thinking on abstruse and technical questions. To me this attitude seems to be precisely wrong. Mr. Russell's religion appears to me to be an essential part, not only of the man himself (that would be his private concern), but of his whole philosophy (which is our concern too). So far as we ignore this side of his work, it seems to me that we are in danger, not only of losing an essential and valuable part of his philosophy, but also of benefiting by that part of it which, taken in isolation, cannot but give a falsely one-sided direction to the philosophical interests of our generation. In Mr. Russell the man is bigger than his philosophy, at any

rate if we give credit to the man for his religion, which, falsely as it seems to me, he struggles to keep out of his philosophy. The fact is that Mr. Russell is divided against himself. Both of the warring sides in him are voiced in his writings, but only one of them finds an ear among the majority of his disciples. There precisely lies the danger.

The escape from this danger does not lie merely in listening to the other side as well, for that would make us suffer from the same discord which runs through Mr. Russell's thought. The chief interest for us is to exhibit the causes of the conflict between Mr. Russell's religious and his philosophical views, and to discuss in what direction a reconciliation might be sought.

First, therefore, I shall examine Mr. Russell's actual statements about religion. Secondly, I shall inquire how far his philosophical theories, allowing for the changes which they have undergone, supply a basis for his religion. Thirdly, I shall point out briefly that Mr. Russell gets the best neither out of religion nor out of philosophy by the sharp antithesis which he sets up between religious experience on the one side and philosophy according to the scientific method on the other.

Like Faust, Mr. Russell might lament: "Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust." His personal problem, one is tempted to conjecture from his writings, is to reconcile the demands of a strongly emotional temperament with the demands of an intellect of unusual precision, subtlety, and analytic power. "Mysticism," he says, "is, in essence, little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe."<sup>1</sup> If this be Mysticism, then beyond doubt Mr. Russell is a Mystic. He has experienced, more strongly than most, this intensity and depth of feeling about the universe. But he has come to look upon

<sup>1</sup> Mysticism and Logic; Hibbert Journal, vol. xii, no. 4, p. 781.

feeling as a danger to clear thinking, a will-o'-the-wisp to the seeker after truth. Yet he acknowledges that "the highest eminence that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought" consists just in "the true union of the mystic and the man of science."<sup>2</sup>

To achieve this true union is, we shall not be far wrong in affirming, Mr. Russell's chief personal concern. Let us trace the different ways in which he has attempted this union, and ask whether his solution is one that we can accept on its merits for ourselves. The chapters of our story, in brief, are that Mr. Russell began as a Mystic at odds with the world because of its indifference to his moral demands, and that he has ended, so far, as a Mystic at peace with the world by refusing to press his moral demands against it. He began with a passion of protest against the universe which science offered as actual and real, and which he then described in language reminiscent of Tennyson's "Nature, red in tooth and claw." He has ended with acceptance of the actual universe by denying that human interest in ideals and values has any bearing on "facts." The true union, if we are to find it in Mr. Russell's present position, consists in that science, or rather logic, leads the way, ascertaining abstract truths, and that Mysticism follows, adjusting our feelings and lives to the revelations of the intellect. Philosophy, so Mr. Russell demands, has to cultivate an "ethical neutrality." It has to refrain from judging reality by our moral or religious standards and ideals, it has to eschew problems of good and evil or of progress, in order to devote itself exclusively to the analysis of "continuity and change."<sup>3</sup> The only philosophical task which is worth while is to make "an inventory of possibilities, a repertory of

<sup>2</sup> *Mysticism and Logic*; Hibbert Journal, vol. xii, no. 4, p. 782.

<sup>3</sup> *Our Knowledge of the External World* (hereafter quoted as "Lowell Lectures"); lect. 1, *passim*.

abstractly tenable hypotheses.”<sup>4</sup> Thus there results the paradoxical position that philosophy is not only forbidden to consider purposes, values, ideals, on the ground that these introduce subjective bias and prejudice, but that it is in addition directed away from the actual to the possible, from the concrete to the abstract. Presumably this is because we can hardly refrain from valuing the actual. Anyhow, the result is that the only valuable philosophy will have nothing to do with values. The only passion which befits the truly scientific thinker is the passion for the contemplation of a world in which passions have no place, because it is only a world of abstract possibilities. Mr. Russell's religion was once a poignant cry of human protest against a non-moral world. Now it has turned into a passionate “receptivity to facts”—not the facts of concrete life and experience which call for moral judgment, but the facts of Mr. Russell's abstract logical and mathematical speculations. It is a religion of clear thinking on problems into which no values enter. The price of the “true union” has been the impoverishment of the materials of philosophical speculation by the sacrifice of the fulness of life.

The milestones in this pilgrim's progress are the famous essays on *The Free Man's Worship*, on *The Study of Mathematics*,<sup>5</sup> and lastly the equally important but less well known one on *The Essence of Religion*<sup>6</sup> which contains his *gran' rifiuto* of all demands on the universe.

The essay entitled *The Free Man's Worship* is not only an eloquent document of the severity of the conflict in the mind of a moral idealist confronted by the ruthlessness of the universe as conceived by science, but it

<sup>4</sup> Spencer Lecture on Scientific Method in Philosophy; Oxford, 1914.

<sup>5</sup> Philosophical Essays; II, III.

<sup>6</sup> Hibbert Journal; vol. xi, no. 1, pp. 46-62.



is above all a defence of the only worthy, indeed the only possible, religion for a man who in such a universe would be "free"—free from fear and despair, still able to retain his faith in the dignity and worth of human life and human ideals. This is how Mr. Russell sums up for us the verdict of Science concerning the place and destiny of human life on this earth:

"That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." <sup>7</sup>

How is man to muster the courage to live in such a world? How is he to face this fate without flinching? How to conquer in spirit and die with head proudly erect? There is but one way: "to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this the free man's worship." <sup>8</sup>

No one will refuse a tribute of admiration to an emotion so nobly passionate, a courage so austere, an assertion so unflinching of the greatness of the human spirit. *Impavidum ferient ruinae*. If such is indeed the truth about the world which we must accept in the name and on the authority of "Science," as almost, if not wholly, beyond doubt, then this is surely the only attitude worthy of a human being—unyielding despair, stoic fortitude in

<sup>7</sup> Philosophical Essays; pp. 60, 61.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 69.

defying a hostile world. Omnipotent matter, human ideals—here we have the two poles between which the modern mind oscillates, fatally divided against itself. Intellect endorses the one as scientific truth, the emotions cling to the other as alone making life worth living. Between them no reconciliation, no peace, is possible. A profound pessimism must inevitably characterize our estimate of the significance of ideals and values in a world which at bottom is nothing but brute matter. Against this we can put nothing but a defiance which in the end is as vain as the ideals themselves on behalf of which we defy the world. The best we can do is to confront the world as Job in the depth of his affliction confronted God: "I know that he will slay me; I have no hope; nevertheless will I maintain my integrity before him." The "trampling march of unconscious power" is bound to defeat us, though the very defeat will be a kind of victory if, accepting it, we count it as nought. To die with spirit unbroken, to contemplate without flinching the merciless extinction of human life and all its values, that is the one way in which we can effectively affirm ourselves and our ideals. Like Plato's "spectator of all time and all existence," Mr. Russell's Free Man is bidden to contemplate the forces of nature, to feel the "passionless splendour of Time, Fate, and Death."<sup>9</sup> But whereas Plato's spectator sees value everywhere, in man and in the universe which is greater than man, Mr. Russell's modern soul sees values only in man, values which the world scorns, and which man can affirm only by scorning the world in his turn. Even the value of the very science which reveals to us such a world is, we must hold, only that it teaches us to know the worst. And we are most true to ourselves when we accept the worst undaunted and, even with the certain prospect

<sup>9</sup> *Philosophical Essays*; p. 69.

of utter annihilation, still affirm that the pursuit of ideals is worth while.

Such is the deep and tragic conflict in the modern mind, such the austere harmony, tinged with pain, which alone it can reach, if harmony it may be called, where anguish and despair are so strangely mingled with defiance and exaltation. Such is the outcome of the passionate quest for passionless truth, such the reward of one who, sharing the Mystic's emotional demands, refuses the Mystic's hope, the Mystic's vision.

The reason why Mr. Russell must refuse the Mystic's vision is that he holds the object of that vision to be a mere product of man's imagination. "Thus man creates God all-powerful and all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what should be."<sup>10</sup> Again and again he reminds us that God is but the creature of our own conscience, our own love of the good. But human thoughts are extinguished with human life. The universe heeds the one as little as the other.

It is true that the mood above described is not kept up throughout the essay without some oscillation. Mr. Russell himself warns us that an attitude of revolt is incompatible with full freedom. "Indignation is still a bondage, for it compels our thoughts to be occupied with an evil world."<sup>11</sup> Wisdom lies in renouncing our desires which are doomed to disappointment, but in holding fast to the thoughts that make us free. "To burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this the free man's worship." Thus a note of resignation is struck—not a passive resignation, but one which transforms the world by "creative idealism." "When, without the bitterness of impotent rebellion, we have learnt both to resign ourselves to the outward rule of Fate and to recognize that the non-human world is unworthy of our worship, it becomes possible at last so to

<sup>10</sup> Philosophical Essays; p. 62.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 64.

transform and refashion the unconscious universe, so to transmute it in the crucible of imagination, that a new image of shining gold replaces the old idol of clay.”<sup>12</sup>

None the less the final note of the essay is a return to defiance. For the world, after all, goes on its relentless way, recking nothing of man and his imaginations.

“Brief and powerless is man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.”<sup>13</sup>

Four years later, in *The Study of Mathematics*, Mr. Russell gives us a fuller example of what he means by “burning with passion for eternal things,” and of what it is for the mind to return from “the dreary exile of the actual world”<sup>14</sup> to a changeless, chanceless world of ideal objects.

“Mathematics” [he writes,] “rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as in poetry.”<sup>15</sup>

The study of mathematics, in fact, is part of “the art of living in the contemplation of great things.”<sup>16</sup> Who can

<sup>12</sup> Philosophical Essays; p. 66.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 70.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 74.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. p. 73.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 71.

mistake the emotional, the mystic, ring of this language about exaltation and the sense of being more than man? Not that mathematics is built on a flash of mystic insight. Its triumphs are achieved by the severe and patient labor of pure reason. But the thrill of its beauty which Mr. Russell voices is the Mystic's thrill, with its strange mixture of exaltation and humility—exaltation in finding one's nature stretched to its best, one's noblest impulses drawn out and satisfied, humility before the truth which is not of human making but is eternal. It is the language of the lover, the lover of wisdom in the Platonic sense. Mr. Russell feels about mathematics as the Socrates of the Symposium feels about beauty, straining after it until in fulness and purity it bursts on his vision. Mr. Russell's thought finds its natural home in the realm of mathematics as Plato's finds it in the realm of forms—both realms alike exempt from mutability and the impatient urgency of sensuous desires. Thither Mr. Russell escapes from "the dreary exile of the actual world," as Plato's soul, struggling free from the toils of sense and mutability in the things around us, recaptures in the contemplation of the forms something of its pre-earthly existence in heaven. It is but another side of the paradox of Mr. Russell's complex personality that he, a modern of the moderns, should stand in many respects so near to Plato. Mr. Russell may combat Plato's Mysticism in the name of science. But the modern scientist and the ancient Mystic meet in fellowship on the common ground of their admiration of mathematics. They admire and recommend it as an instrument for the training of the mind on exactly the same grounds, viz., because it teaches us to apprehend general truths, because it emancipates reason from preoccupation with particulars. At this point, however, they part company. For Plato, mathematics is the entry into the world of forms, whence the path of dialectic continues straight to the highest

form, the Form of Good. To Mr. Russell, mathematics is the supreme type of that science which pursues eternal truths, regardless of practical interests, of moral distinctions, of human preferences and hopes. To both mathematics is the propædæutic to philosophy—in Plato, as Mr. Russell interprets him, to a philosophy built on mystic vision, but in Mr. Russell himself to a philosophy cut down to symbolic logic.

Lastly, *The Essence of Religion* gives us the full flower of Mr. Russell's religious faith. Many critics, like Professor Pringle-Pattison,<sup>17</sup> have found in this essay, compared with *The Free Man's Worship*, a characteristic change of front, a far-reaching readjustment of outlook. The note of defiance is gone. The opposition of fact and ideal, though still profound, is no longer so acute. The resignation is more passive. Instead of being called on to transfigure the world in the crucible of the imagination, we are reminded, in the spirit of Spinoza, that to understand the unalterable necessity of things is to be cured of indignation and protest. Throughout the emphasis lies on worship, acquiescence, love—in short, on union with the universe in thought, in feeling, in will. "Union in thought is knowledge, union in feeling is love, union in will is service."<sup>18</sup> In *The Free Man's Worship* man says to the universe, You can destroy me, but you cannot break my spirit; in my innermost soul I am free from your power. In *The Essence of Religion* he says, I want to be at one with you. The free man had been told to achieve union with the universe with a high hand. "To take into the innermost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to be—death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, and the powerlessness of man before the blind

<sup>17</sup> *The Free Man's Worship, a Consideration of Mr. Bertrand Russell's Views on Religion*; Hibbert Journal, vol. xii, no. 1, pp. 47-63.

<sup>18</sup> *The Essence of Religion*; Hibbert Journal, vol. xii, no. 1, p. 59.

hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity—to feel these things and to know them is to conquer them.”<sup>19</sup> The later essay repeats this call on us “to conquer inwardly the world’s indifference.”<sup>20</sup> But the mood is gentler, a mood of peace and love. There is still an echo of the “fundamental evils” which “are due to the blind empire of matter,”<sup>21</sup> but we are not supposed to be still quivering with the fight against fear and despair. The “divine part” of man “is not checked by what seems hostile, but interpenetrates it and becomes one with it.”<sup>22</sup> By the side of the “selective worship” and the “selective love” which we give to the ideal of good, there is now admitted to be an “impartial worship” and an “impartial love” which is given indifferently to all that exists. With these the sense of solitude and isolation is gone which the free man still felt, alone with his ideals in a hostile world. Now, “wisdom does not feel this solitude because it can achieve union even with what seems most alien.”<sup>23</sup> The important change of front thus lies in the admission that there may be worship and love of the actual, where formerly we had been told “the non-human world is unworthy of our worship.”<sup>24</sup> Or, to sum it up in one sentence, formerly the religious man renounced all demands on the actual world but retained his claim to refashion the world in idea. Now he renounces even this claim, and accepts the universe just as it is. “The insistent demand that our ideals shall be already realised in the world is the last prison from which wisdom must be freed. Every demand is a prison, and wisdom is only free when it asks nothing.”<sup>25</sup>

By this abstention from making any demands on the universe Mr. Russell hopes to save religion from the

<sup>19</sup> *Philosophical Essays*; p. 68.

<sup>20</sup> *The Essence of Religion*; p. 62.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* p. 57.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* p. 62.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 62.

<sup>24</sup> *Philosophical Essays*; p. 66.

<sup>25</sup> *The Essence of Religion*; p. 62.

wreck of dogma. "In order to free religion from all dependence upon dogma it is necessary to abstain from any demand that the world shall conform to our standards. Every such demand is an endeavour to impose self upon the world."<sup>26</sup> The whole essay is a plea for "a religion without fettering dogmas."<sup>27</sup> Let us surrender dogmas "to which an intellectually honest assent grows daily more difficult."<sup>28</sup> Is not religion at bottom a matter of feeling rather than of belief—of feeling that neither justifies nor is justified by any judgment about the nature of the actual world? Why not then discard the beliefs that trouble the intellect, and live by feeling a "life in the whole"?<sup>29</sup> To believe nothing, but to feel yourself one with the whole, that is, in effect, the reconciliation of religion and science which Mr. Russell offers.

Nothing novel in this, it will be said. True, but it is a view in which many are tempted to seek an escape from an intolerable conflict within themselves, and to have this view defended with all the sincerity and eloquence of a man of Mr. Russell's reputation is in itself a call to re-examination.

Not that Mr. Russell's attitude and mood remain perfectly uniform. Here, as in *The Free Man's Worship*, there are oscillations betraying traces of other views. Though we are to rid ourselves of dogma and live by feeling, yet the "life in the whole" is, in the same breath, described also as an "habitual direction of our thoughts."<sup>30</sup> May we then think but not believe? Again, the feeling which is religion has, as Mr. Russell finely says, "a quality of infinity," but it has also its own vision, its own way of contemplating the world. "The quality of infinity, which we feel, is not to be accounted for by the perception of new objects . . . ;

<sup>26</sup> *The Essence of Religion*; p. 60.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* p. 47.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 51.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* p. 46.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* p. 46.



it is to be accounted for, rather, by a different way of regarding the same objects, a contemplation more impersonal, more vast, more filled with love. . . ."<sup>31</sup> Have we no right to formulate this contemplation, stating to ourselves what we see and believe? Again we read, "The things which have this quality of infinity seem to give an insight deeper than the piecemeal knowledge of our daily life."<sup>32</sup> Surely it is clear that Mr. Russell's religious feeling expresses itself in beliefs of its own, and that the dogmas which he rejects are beliefs which have become for him non-expressive of religious feeling, not because they are insufficiently religious, but because they conflict with his scientific demands. In short, there are two strains in Mr. Russell's religion. There is the religion of clear thinking, in which the intellect presents to feeling for impartial worship the actual world of science and logic. And there is the religion of mystic emotion, which offers selective worship to an ideal of good visible only to the eye of imagination. Again, though we are to be "free" and "wise" by making no demands upon the world, yet we are also told that it will be an essential part of our worship of the ideal to wish it to exist as fully as possible, and of our worship of the actual to wish it to be as good as possible. This is as near as Mr. Russell comes to the position sometimes called Meliorism, viz., that the world is capable of being made better by our efforts, and that the chief duty of man is to remould it nearer to his heart's desire. Clearly, the no-demand attitude is seriously compromised when wishes are allowed to bridge the gap between actual and ideal. Moreover, are our wishes condemned to be ineffectual? May we not, must we not, try to realize them? to make the actual an embodied ideal, and the ideal a realized fact? Mr. Russell himself holds

<sup>31</sup> The Essence of Religion; p. 49.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

that religious feeling, however undogmatic, may be "dominant in action"; that universal love will express itself in service. But unless such action and service are held by him to be doomed to utter failure, of all life's disillusionments the cruelest, he must allow that action can break down the division of the ideal from the actual. And if action, why not thought? If the actual can to any degree be transformed into the ideal actualized, can it in principle be alien to the ideal? It is surely a poor "union" that Mr. Russell offers us in the shape of a pious wish that actual and ideal may fuse one with the other, whilst all the time he holds them on principle apart.

However that may be, we have the logical outcome of the no-demand attitude in Mr. Russell's most recent programme of scientific method in philosophy.<sup>33</sup> Science is objective, impersonal, impartial. On the other hand, to look upon the universe from a moral or religious standpoint is to make demands, to "give legislative force to our wishes," to philosophize as taste and temperament dictate. Hence, instead of the accumulation of assured results of scientific research, we have the never-ending conflict of private opinions, which explains the futility of all philosophy of the past. The philosophy of the future, so we are told, must employ the logical-analytic method, and in philosophy thus conceived there is no room for the attitude of religion. Indeed, the practice of the scientific method, it would seem, must itself be our religion, for only by the adoption of this method is the surrender of the self final, complete, exhaustive. Only in the receptivity to facts is our "submission to the universe" wholly purged of narrow, finite claims upon it. Only the dispassionate attitude of science, asking nothing, accepting everything, releases the pent-up flood of worship and of love.

<sup>33</sup> Spencer Lecture; Oxford, 1914.

This then is Mr. Russell's religion. What are we to say of it? Must we accept it, and with it the universe which will permit us this religion or none?

Take first the free man's world. What if it be but an evil dream? his terror and his courage alike begotten of an illusion? man defying a bogey of his own making? Of course, if the greatness of matter and the littleness of man be indeed the whole truth, if such greatness as is open to man be but a passionate protest against unheeding fact, or else submissive resignation—but why grant these premises? Mr. Russell adjusts religion to science. He will not allow ideals to have any grip upon the actual. But may not the reason why science gives us a world empty of values and reckless of ideals be just this, that it practises a deliberate abstraction from this aspect of things, an abstraction necessary enough, but not to be taken as the whole truth? To argue thus is not to deny or break down the limitations of outlook which are essential to the success of the scientist in his own proper work. It is not proposed that the hardly-won disinterestedness of science should be surrendered. Its "ethical neutrality," its indifference to mundane desires, are not in danger. The physicist, to adopt Mr. Russell's own words, will not be required "to prove the ethical importance of his ions and atoms," nor the biologist "to prove the utility of the plants or animals which he dissects."<sup>34</sup> Neither is astronomy asked to become again astrology. If the "matter" of the physicist and the chemist does not exhibit ethical qualities, nor show itself possessed of any other kind of value, well and good. But that is not to say that physics and chemistry give us all the truth that is to be had about "matter." In short, the point is that we ought to deal honestly even with matter. We ought to give it credit for all the possibilities which it shows itself to possess. This is not an appeal to

<sup>34</sup> Lowell Lectures; p. 27.

imagination, but to experience; to familiar facts which can be verified for the looking. Why not then look, for example, at the part which matter plays in human life? Our bodies are matter of the same sort as that which the physicist and the chemist studies. Whatever laws these sciences formulate hold good of the human frame. Yet in man matter, organized as body and especially as nerves and brain, becomes the basis of feeling, thought, and will. To adopt the language of evolution: at a certain level of complexity and organization it takes on, or gives rise to, this surprising, this startlingly new quality or power which we call sentience, thought, reason, in short, mind. Through mind science becomes possible, and science is the study of matter among other things. Truly, miracles are coming thick and fast, when we think of matter as, under certain conditions, giving rise to this power of contemplating itself. And further, with mind comes will, and the subordination of matter, alike in bodily movement and in the control and the transformation of the physical environment, to ideas and ideals. Is not this a fresh possibility that we ought, in fairness, to set down to the credit of matter—this capacity of becoming instrumental to the embodiment or expression of purpose? And all this not in defiance of the laws of physics and chemistry, but in faithful accord with them, in the spirit of Bacon's maxim: *Naturae non imperatur nisi parendo*. And, lastly, the material body as a factor in human life forms part of a whole to which no one will deny the possession of ethical qualities. In abstraction from this whole, the matter of the body may not deserve to have such qualities predicated of it; but it may fitly be said to share in them as an integral part of the whole person who is the proper subject of moral predicates. There is no escaping from this by restricting ethical qualities to the non-bodily part of man, under the name of soul or character. No such

crude abstractions will work here. Are we to exclude the desires of the body from the sphere of moral judgment? Or, because they are desires and so far classed as "mental," are we to deny their patent physical side? Hunger and sex are enough to wreck these artificial distinctions. Again, the James-Lange theory of emotions may serve to show us that we are dealing here with facts which cut across the usual distinctions of body and soul. And when we look beyond the body and consider that the physical environment of man is capable of being the scene of the realization of his purposes, yes, and his ideals; the object of his scientific study; a source of beauty; a symbol of God—then, I suggest, we can hardly help concluding that there is much more in "matter" than we should ever have learnt or expected if what physics and chemistry tell us were the whole truth about it. If there is anything in this point of view, we shall have to revise Mr. Russell's conception of the place of human minds and ideals in this material universe. We shall have doubts about matter being necessarily and always and in all its forms unconscious. We shall have doubts about denying to matter this or any other quality merely on the ground that such quality does not come within the purview of science, or, appearing there, is of set purpose neglected. This may seem "mysticism" to Mr. Russell—and in any case he will not agree with it. But I am content to have argued for a point of view from which neither the pessimistic estimate of the fate of values nor the heroics of the Free Man appear as the only possible truth. Technically, to sum up, the issue turns just on this point: No one blames science for not considering values where none appear; or for disregarding them where they do appear, if such abstraction is necessary for pursuing, without deviation or confusion, the special character of things with which a given science deals. But to accept such abstraction as final, and demand the adjustment of our

whole outlook to it, when experience is full of evidence that matter has far greater possibilities and more varied qualities than certain sciences recognize—that is to fetter the mind, not to free it.

And, again, have we not the right to ask Mr. Russell to be in earnest about his own suggestion that man is a child of Nature, and to judge Nature's character by that of her offspring? "A strange mystery it is that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurryings through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child subject still to her power but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking mother."<sup>35</sup> Whence have come to man these gifts, this knowledge, these ideals? From an alien and inhuman world? That were mystery indeed. Have we not here the patent result of abstraction, the wilful divorce of facts which should throw light on one another? In *The Essence of Religion*, Mr. Russell speaks of man as "a strange mixture of God and brute,"<sup>36</sup> as one part particular and finite, the other part universal, infinite, divine. But if man is wholly a product of Nature and yet is in any part divine, how can we refuse to interpret the potentialities of Nature in the light of that which she produces? Man, loving ideals and knowing good and evil, is either not wholly a product of Nature or Nature is not wholly lacking in those ideal qualities which man's worship seeks and loves. True, in *The Free Man's Worship*, ideals were treated as the creatures of man's own thought, and God, in effect, as the fiction of his own conscience. But that is no longer the tone of *The Essence of Religion*. There the "divine part" of man is said to "live in the whole," and the whole is assuredly more than Nature *plus* human fictions. On the contrary, "the object of selective worship is the ideal

<sup>35</sup> *Philosophical Essays*; p. 61.

<sup>36</sup> *Hibbert Journal*; vol. xi, p. 47.

good which belongs to the world of universals." Universals indeed do not "exist" in the sense in which the actual world exists, but, like the entities of mathematics, they form an objective, supra-personal order, which is as little, or as much, the creation of human thinking as is the actual world. The divine part of man, we can hardly escape the conclusion, must seek union with, and derive its being from, something objectively divine in the universe.

But it is just from this line of thought that Mr. Russell has debarred himself by the way in which he opposes the actual and the ideal—in short, by being half-hearted about the "whole." Religion is to be "life in the whole."<sup>37</sup> But Mr. Russell offers us no whole to live in; only a juxtaposition of two irreconcilables, an existing world of blind and omnipotent matter, and a non-existing world of ideals. Moreover, must we not hold that only if human nature is in principle a whole, or capable of being a whole, can it seek, and succeed in attaining, life in the whole? But man as little as his world is for Mr. Russell a whole. He too is a compound of two irreconcilables at war with one another—a finite, self-seeking part, and an infinite, self-surrendering part. If only the latter lives in the whole, it is not the whole man that does so. The union will be one-sided. The spiritual friction will persist. And, again, it will not be a union with a world which can truly be called a whole, so long as the ideal and the actual are on principle divorced. There is nothing that deserves or evokes worship in a world so wholly devoid of moral values, so alien to all ideals, that we ought not even to demand their being realized in it. There is nothing that deserves or evokes worship in ideals which do not express, so to speak, the *nisus* of the actual towards perfection; which are so little rooted in the actual that we have no right

<sup>37</sup> Hibbert Journal; vol. xi, p. 46.

to demand anything on their behalf. Indeed, in this respect the defiance of *The Free Man's Worship* seems more admirable than the renunciation of *The Essence of Religion*. The former allowed ideals to gain the victory at least in thought, to transform the actual at least in imagination. The latter surrenders even this modest claim. Truly, the great renunciation comes very near to being a great betrayal.

There is one further characteristic of Mr. Russell's attitude towards religion which is too important not to deserve a comment. It is his ever repeated cry for "freedom"—freedom through peace and union of the soul with the world, freedom through the inward peace and union of the soul with herself. But freedom from what? The list of Mr. Russell's answers is instructive. The free man was to be free from fear and despair, from the bitterness of impotent rebellion against "the wanton tyranny which rules his outward life"; free too from the desire for "those personal goods that are subject to the mutations of Time."<sup>38</sup> This freedom was to be achieved by the passion for eternal things, by accepting the alien world and reconquering it in part through the power of art and of philosophy. In *The Essence of Religion* it is rather the "tyranny of desire and daily care"<sup>39</sup> which is emphasized, the trammels of the struggling self with its exclusive, partial demands for satisfaction. The problem is to escape "from the prison house of eager wishes and little thoughts"<sup>40</sup> by cultivating, through the suspension of will, through the utter merging of the self, and through the complete renunciation of even our most cherished ideals, that "infinite life" in us of which "the impartiality leads to truth in thought, justice in action, and universal love in feeling."<sup>41</sup> That in all this there is much truth, no one will care to deny. In

<sup>38</sup> *Philosophical Essays*; p. 64.

<sup>39</sup> *Hibbert Journal*; xi, p. 46.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* p. 47.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* p. 47.



the language of his contrast between the finite and the infinite in man, Mr. Russell rightly insists on the need for self-discipline in man's ascent to spiritual freedom. No one could urge more insistently the danger of the narrow vision, the spiritual blindness that comes with immersion in self-centred cares and petty preoccupations. No one could preach more eloquently the duty of breaking down all barriers between the self and the world, of living habitually in the company of "thoughts which give breadth to life," of that universal love "to which imperfections are no barrier, and that unifies the world by the unity of its own contemplation."<sup>42</sup> Where he fails to carry all of us with him is in assimilating loyalty to ideals to the tyranny of desires, and in treating the religious conviction of the perfection of the world as the supremest and most insidious instance of the imposition on the universe of our selfish demands.

Here, it seems to me, we touch the root of the matter. It is the *judgment of perfection* which Mr. Russell challenges. At the bottom of all his pleas for a religion without dogma there lies the fierce hostility to one single dogma, viz., "the belief that in the end our ideals are fulfilled in the outer world." Sometimes Mr. Russell's arguments against this belief are based on the familiar ground that it is subversive of morality; for what meaning can there be in the struggle for good if the world is good already? The actual world is not good, and the ideal is not actual. The actual world is in principle indifferent to good, and the ideal in principle incapable of being realized. These are in substance Mr. Russell's counter-dogmas. They are the corner-stones of the creed of his religion hall-marked by science. But, as often, Mr. Russell himself supplies the ammunition for combating his views. Does he not remind us that "bare morality is very inadequate as a motive for those who hunger and

<sup>42</sup> Hibbert Journal; xi, p. 49.

thirst after the infinite"?<sup>43</sup> Does he not realize that the judgment of perfection is the voice of that very love of which he says himself that "imperfections are no barrier to it"? Does he not recognize in it the fine flower of religious renunciation, which indeed renounces not so much its ideal demand that the real should be perfect and the perfect be real, as the cocksure finality of the moral judgment that the actual world is hostile to ideals and incurably imperfect? One of the chief mysteries in religion is, in fact, the mystery that moral zeal does coexist with, nay feeds upon, the conviction of that perfection of the world which makes us see in it a revelation of God.

So far we have passed in review those of Mr. Russell's writings in which he explicitly deals with religion. We must now turn to a line of thought which of recent years has increasingly engaged Mr. Russell's interest, and which would appear to have cut away the whole basis and background of his religious reaction to the world, without, so it would seem, his having realized the fact. The philosophical status assigned to Nature in *The Free Man's Worship* has been so transformed in the *Problems of Philosophy* and in the more recent Lowell Lectures on *Our Knowledge of the External World*, that it is hard to see how Mr. Russell can still continue to think of it as the blind empire of matter, or the tyranny of a non-human power. Writing in 1903, Mr. Russell treated matter as so much of a reality that he personified it as a hostile force, a relentless fate, and invested it, in the name of scientific truth, with attributes such as omnipotence and mercilessness which men have sometimes ascribed to their gods. Matter played in his universe the Mephistophelean part of the *Macht die stets verneint*.

All this has been changed by Mr. Russell's subsequent epistemological speculations. Inquiring into the founda-

<sup>43</sup> Hibbert Journal; xi, p. 50.

tions of our knowledge of nature he arrived, in *Problems*, at the conclusion that we know of the existence of matter only by an inference from sense-data, and that this inference rests at bottom on nothing more reasonable than an "instinctive belief"—an instinct moreover which (though Mr. Russell forgets to point this out) appears to entitle us to no assertion either way about the moral or non-moral character of matter. The Lowell Lectures bring a further change. Pursuing the same line of inquiry, Mr. Russell now holds material things to be known, not by an instinctive inference, but by a "logical construction," a "thing" being a logically constructed class or group of actual and possible sense-data. It is not too much to say that Mr. Russell has abolished matter in the original sense. His sense-data do not, like Berkeley's "ideas," exist only in minds human or divine, but in respect of its immaterialism his position now is essentially the same as Berkeley's. In short, in transforming the "blind but omnipotent mother of man" into a mere logical system of sense-data, Mr. Russell has knocked the bottom out of the philosophical foundations of his religion.

To prove this, let us consider his argument somewhat more in detail. Our immediate experience of the "things" which we believe to be physical turns out on analysis to consist of what we see, hear, taste, smell, feel—in other words, of colors and sounds, tastes and smells, temperature-qualities like hot and cold, touch-qualities like rough and smooth, shapes, sizes, etc. These "sense-data," however, may not be ascribed to the real object; they are "appearances." And this for two reasons: First, because they are so variable with changing circumstances and points of view, that it is impossible to say what, *e.g.*, the "real" color and shape of a thing are. Secondly, because sense-data are "private" to individual minds, whereas the object is common, or, in Mr. Russell's

language, "public" and "neutral." The conclusion drawn from these considerations is that we cannot identify the object with the sense-data or treat the sense-data directly as properties of the object. Yet "sense-data" are the "solid basis" of knowledge. We cannot know the object except by means of them, we reach the object by an inference from them. But this inference turns out to be precarious and inconclusive. Is there anything over and above the sense-data which differ for each observer and are private to each? Is there any such thing as matter? We cannot appeal here to the testimony of other people, for we experience other people and their testimony in the first instance just as sense-data, so that the same doubtful inference is involved in the belief that other minds exist as in the belief that physical bodies exist. Solipsism, however repugnant to common sense and the working beliefs even of the philosopher, cannot be shown to be wrong. "We can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences."<sup>44</sup> The inference then which takes us beyond sense-data to other minds and physical things derives its force from an instinctive belief, which is found to simplify and systematize our experience without ever leading to any consequences which could compel us to abandon it. Sense-data and instinctive beliefs—out of these materials we fashion our knowledge of our environment, material and social. The task of philosophy is to set forth "the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs,"<sup>45</sup> to remove their conflict, to present them in the form of a harmonious system.

In passing on to the Lowell Lectures we must, as lesser mortals whose wings flap heavily, forego most of the thrills of Mr. Russell's light-pinioned flights into the rarefied upper air of logical speculation. We shall follow only the fate of physical things. We begin by noting

<sup>44</sup> Problems; p. 34.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 39.

with pleasure that, setting out to clear away "incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber,"<sup>46</sup> Mr. Russell sweeps onto the rubbish heap chiefly his own material things of *Problems* as well as the instinctive inferences by which they were supposed to be known. Belief in the existence of other minds is still held to be unavoidable though unprovable. But as regards physical things, the demand now is to interpret them in terms of pure experience, if I may borrow the phrase from Avenarius. We are to discard all "soft data," *i.e.*, all elements of ordinary experience and belief which become doubtful under pressure of criticism. Eliminating in this way all hypothetical elements, all assumptions that are not self-evident or capable of proof, we are left with "hard data" of two main kinds: (a) sense-data, (b) the general truths of logic. This list is capable of some extension, but in these two elements we touch the hardness of bed-rock, so to speak. In them we are face to face with a self-evidence so complete that doubt is impossible. What then is the result of this attempt "to state what is known in terms of sensible objects, *i.e.*, sense-data, alone"?<sup>47</sup> What is the "bare outcome of experience"?<sup>48</sup> We say, for example, that we look at a table as we walk round it. But "what we really know from experience, when we have freed our minds from the assumption of permanent 'things' with changing appearances . . . is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations [? = sense-data, sensible objects?] with changes in visual sensations [? = sequences of visual sense-data?]"<sup>49</sup> Similarly we correlate with the sense-data of sight those of touch and other senses, so that, given some of a correlated group, we are led to expect others. Such occurrence of expected sense-data is all the verification which we can hope for either in common

<sup>46</sup> Lowell Lectures; p. 42.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* p. 77.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* p. 83.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* p. 77.

sense or in physics. Lastly, in bare experience there is no distinction between illusions and dreams as "unreal" and waking experiences as "real." Both are alike made up of sense-data, and there is nothing more real than these. They are just what they are. The only difference is that the sense-data in illusion and dream are connected with other sense-data in abnormal and unusual ways. Usually, for instance, one visual datum is correlated with one tactual datum. But the man who sees double but touches single is warranted in saying only that "the manner of the correlation of touch and sight is unusual" in this instance.<sup>50</sup>

This is the point to which "one man's unaided observations"<sup>51</sup> will carry him. Clearly, on so slender a basis no man can build much of a science. This "unstable" world of "momentary sense-data" is no adequate foundation for either physics or physiology. But the very method of appealing to bare experience and using only "hard data" has, so far, compelled Mr. Russell to argue solipsistically. Excepting only the laws of logic, there is nothing, according to him, of which we are so sure as our own sense-data. Strictly speaking, if we are to believe both *Problems*<sup>52</sup> and *Our Knowledge of the External World*,<sup>53</sup> they are more certain even than "I" am myself, for the "self," with its apparent permanence amid change, is notably a "soft" datum. It would be wicked to press Mr. Russell with the awkward and inconvenient question, what reason there is to call the sense-data "mine," if "I" am doubtful and ambiguous. We must accept the privacy of sense-data, else the fair structure of the theory tumbles to the ground. Yet Mr. Russell, at a point of his argument when the assumption of other minds is still explicitly disavowed,<sup>54</sup> talks reck-

<sup>50</sup> Lowell Lectures; p. 82.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p. 83.

<sup>52</sup> Problems of Philosophy; p. 29.

<sup>53</sup> Lowell Lectures; p. 74.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 82.

lessly of "our" sense-data, meaning his and the reader's, and not using, as he should, the solipsist's *pluralis majesticus*.

This then is the solipsist's predicament. His own sense-data are not enough to found the stable world of common sense and science on, but having put aside as too soft the hypothesis of the existence of other minds, he is debarred from eking out his own experience by the testimony of others. For that testimony, in terms of sense-data, is only "noises and shapes."<sup>55</sup>

We shall not follow the ingenious hypothesis of a Leibnizian universe of monads by which Mr. Russell completes the materials needed for the construction of a physical thing. We will note rather the pronounced flirtation with solipsism which characterizes all his epistemological inquiries, a flirtation which stands confessed in an article in *Scientia*,<sup>56</sup> where Mr. Russell acknowledges his hope to be able to build up physics on a foundation of pure solipsism, and to avoid the hypothesis of other minds altogether.

In face of this development we need only ask, What has become of that "universal soul" in man of which it was said in *The Essence of Religion* that it links all men together and breaks through the barriers of competition and conflict which finite selves erect against each other? What has become of the "infinite nature" of man and the infinite life in which it enables him to share? "Between the infinite nature in one man and the infinite nature in another there can be no essential conflict. If its embodiments are incomplete, they supplement each other; its division among different men is accidental to its character, and the infinite in all constitutes one universal nature."<sup>57</sup> This is not the language of a solipsist. The ingenuities of the logical-

<sup>55</sup> Lowell Lectures; p. 82.

<sup>56</sup> Vol. xvi, no. xxxvi-4 (Aug. 1914).

<sup>57</sup> *The Essence of Religion*; p. 48.

analytical method are forgotten to the benefit of truth. Truly, "zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust."

Epistemology, in short, has played havoc with the universe of Mr. Russell's religion. It has dissolved "omnipotent matter" into a logical construction of sense-data, and the infinite soul of man into the solipsist's shivering wraith. What now becomes of the free man's defiance of fate and doom? Or what of his renunciation? Why should the human mind confess itself the plaything and the sport of structures which it has itself built up? Why should it refrain from making moral and religious as well as logical demands? Clearly, whatever may be the proper religious reaction to the material universe as now interpreted by Mr. Russell, neither the former heroics of unyielding despair nor the chastened wisdom of renunciation are any longer in place.

What, finally, in the light of all this, are we to say of the "ethical neutrality," the restriction to logical analysis of "continuity and change," which Mr. Russell would impose upon philosophy, and that in the name of its emancipation? If Mr. Russell really means that the things which have a quality of infinity—and these, we must remember, are the things of the actual world—"give an insight deeper than the piecemeal knowledge of daily life," why in the name of reason should we be debarred from making this insight available for philosophy?

It is impossible not to recall here that saner and more generous conception of philosophy and of human freedom which Mr. Russell himself offers us in the final chapter of *Problems*. There he speaks of philosophy in the same fervent language in which elsewhere he speaks of religion. The philosophical contemplation of the universe brings "freedom from narrow and personal aims."<sup>58</sup> It enlarges the boundaries of the self. Through contact with

<sup>58</sup> *Problems of Philosophy*; p. 244.



the infinity of the universe, the mind achieves itself some share in infinity.<sup>59</sup> The unalloyed desire for truth is the intellectual form of that "impartiality which in action is justice and in emotion universal love."<sup>60</sup> Is not this exactly what in *The Essence of Religion* Mr. Russell had said of religion? In fact, "the free intellect will see as God might see."<sup>61</sup> Could philosophy be praised more highly or more truly? Yet surely God is not merely occupied in contemplating "continuity and change" by the logical-analytic method.

In the exaltation of this last chapter of *Problems* we catch again the Mystic's voice. But it is no longer the voice of a Mystic defying, or resigning himself to, a hostile world, nor the voice of one denying that Mysticism can be based on, or lead to, any valid judgments about the nature of the world. Rather, we hear words that promise genuine peace and lasting union. "Contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts but also the objects of our actions and our affections; it makes us citizens of the universe."<sup>62</sup> Nothing now remains but for Mr. Russell to be in earnest alike about the "universe," which will not then be whittled down to the abstractions of mathematical physics, and about the "citizenship," which will not then demand ethical neutrality nor exercise itself merely in the "invention," by "abstract imagination," of an "infinite number of possible hypotheses." If Mr. Russell had not arbitrarily cut down the sphere of philosophical contemplation by imposing on it a false ideal of becoming "scientific," he would find a sufficient task even for his own thought in exploring the high-ways and by-ways of the fair city of his philosophical vision. He would not find it necessary to maintain that "Mysticism is to be commended only as an emotional attitude, not as a creed about the

<sup>59</sup> *Problems of Philosophy*; p. 246, (summarized).

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p. 249.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* p. 247.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* p. 249.

world,"<sup>63</sup> or that religious union with the universe must be "independent of all beliefs about the nature of the universe."<sup>64</sup> For though this secures that religion, since it asserts nothing, cannot be intellectually false, yet religion pays for this freedom from error the heavy price of not being able to justify itself reflectively as being rooted in the nature of the universe. Here surely there are problems for the intellect more important even than "the analysis of continuity and change." Let Mr. Russell recognize that in the philosophical city too there are many mansions, and that not all old mansions are outworn because it has pleased Mr. Russell to build a new one. There are more forms and methods than one of that "citizenship of the universe," of which Mr. Russell finely says that in it "consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears."<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *Mysticism and Logic*; *Hibbert Journal*; vol. xii, no. 4, p. 787.

<sup>64</sup> *The Essence of Religion*; p. 60.

<sup>65</sup> *Problems*; p. 249.